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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT
Defendants Miles Walter Langley and Robert P. Thorpe are listed as defendants in
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant/Appellee Ranger Insurance Company ("Ranger") agrees with the
Jurisdictional Statement in Appellants George Lee and Gerald Lee's ("the Lees")
Appellate Brief.
II. ISSUES PRESERVED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATIONS OF ISSUES BELOW
The Lees present five issues on appeal, none of which question the jury's verdict.
They have correctly identified the standard of review this Court should apply to each
issue. (Appellants' Brief, v-viii). However, the Lees have not shown where each issue
has been preserved in the record pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a)(5)(A). This is a significant omission, since Ranger contends that the Lees have not
properly preserved their first and second issues, pertaining to jury instructions.
Regardless of how the Lees have chosen to frame their issues on appeal, Ranger
believes the overarching issue for this Court's consideration is as follows:
Whether the jury's verdict that bail bondsman Miles Langley did not assault or
recklessly endanger the Lees should be overturned based on alleged errors that had no
impact on the jury's decision?
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
There are no statutes or rules that are determinative of any issues on appeal. While
the Lees claim that Utah Code Ann. §31 A-35-601 (1999), "Acts of [Bail Bond] Agent,"
and §53-11-101, et seq, "Bail Bond Recovery Act," govern this appeal, the trial court
noted that these statutes apply to sureties and bail recovery agents who are licensed in

Utah. (R. 1187, p. 6). Since the Lees contend on appeal that Miles Langley was not
licensed in Utah, these statutes are inapplicable.
Should this Court conclude that these statutes are determinative of this appeal,
Ranger points out that Utah Code Ann. §77-20-8.5 (1998) authorizes a surety to arrest a
fugitive "at any time . . . and at any place within the state" for the purpose of surrendering
him to the court. (Appellants' Addendum 25). Moreover, the statutes do not prohibit a
bondsman duly licensed in another state from entering Utah to apprehend a fugitive
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.
IV, STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Parties, Course of the Proceedings and Disposition
Below,

The Appellants are brothers George and Gerald Lee, two Utah residents who claim
they were assaulted by a Colorado bail recovery agent, Miles Langley, on April 2, 1999,
in Vernal, Utah. (R. 2). At the time of the alleged assault, there were two outstanding
warrants in Colorado for Gerald Lee, one for driving under the influence and one for
operating a vehicle without a driver's license. (R. 1187, p. 105; R. 999 Exhibit 1, pp.
001-002).
Defendant Robert P. Thorpe owned A-l Bail Bonds ("A-l"), a bail bond agency in
Grand Junction, Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 254; M. Thorpe depo. p. 6).1 Maria Thorpe, his

*Page 254 of the trial court transcript notes that witness Maria Thorpe's deposition
transcript was made part of the record. (R. 1187, p. 254). However, it appears that the
clerk of the trial court did not assign a separate page number for her deposition transcript
in the record. When citing portions of Ms. Thorpe's deposition transcript in this brief,
^

wife, was also an owner. (R. 1187, p. 254; M. Thorpe depo. pp. 5-6). Shortly after
Gerald Lee was arrested in Colorado in 1998 for the two separate offenses, he purchased
two bail bonds from A-1; the purchase of these bonds allowed him to be released from the
jail in Colorado until his initial criminal court hearings. (R. 1187, p. 106; Exhibit 2, pp.
008-010).
Ranger is a bail bond surety insurer in Texas. (R. 1187, pp. 256-58). Ranger
contracted with A-1, through a general agent known as North American Bail Bond
Services ("NABBS"), to supply surety bail bonds. (R. 1187, pp. 258-59; R. 999, Exhibit
2, p. 018). Ranger acted as principal and A-1 as independent contractor. (R. 999, Exhibit
2; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., pp. 51-52). The Bail Bond Underwriting Agreement
signed by A-1, Ranger and NABBS provides that A-1 is "solely responsible for . .. the
apprehension,. . . arrest, extradition and/or surrender of errant bond principals
[fugitives]." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 020). A-1 also agreed to conduct apprehensions of
fugitives "properly and lawfully in compliance with all laws, statutes, regulations and
prudent business practices utilized in the bail bond business." (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 020).
Miles Langley was a Colorado resident who was licensed as a bail recovery agent
in Colorado. (R. 1187, pp. 56, 62-63). He was self-employed. (R. 1187, p. 61). Mr.
Langley claimed A-1 hired him to apprehend Gerald Lee, a claim contested by A-1. (R.

Ranger has cited to the page of the trial transcript where her deposition transcript is made
part of the record, then cites to the page of the deposition transcript containing the
relevant testimony. The cited portions of her deposition testimony are attached as
Addendum A.
3

1187, p. 74; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 39). It was undisputed that Mr. Langley
was never an employee, independent contractor or agent of Ranger. (R. 1187, p. 259).
The Lees deposed Mr. Langley in connection with this lawsuit, but he died before trial.
(R. 1187, p. 55).
The Lees filed a Complaint in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Vernal, Utah,
against Mr. Langley, Mr. Thorpe in his capacity as owner of A-l, and Ranger in its
capacity as bond surety. (R. 2; R. 1187, p. 33). The Complaint alleges that on April 2,
1999, Mr. Langley, acting as an employee of A-l, apprehended Gerald Lee in Vernal,
Utah, in order to take him to Colorado on the arrest warrants. (R. 2). The apprehension
occurred at the home of George Lee, and during the apprehension, a scuffle ensued
between the Lee brothers and Mr. Langley. (R. 3). The Lees allege they sustained
physical injuries during the fight. (R. 3). The Complaint lists assault and battery, kidnap,
and reckless endangerment, as the causes of action. (R. 3). The Complaint seeks both
compensatory and punitive damages. (R. 3).
This case was tried to a jury in Vernal on February 2-4, 2004, with Judge Lynn
Payne presiding. (R. 1187). Neither Mr. Thorpe nor Mr. Langley appeared at trial,
leaving Ranger as the only defendant present. (R. 1187). Although the Lees did not
plead false imprisonment in their Complaint, Judge Payne permitted them to present this
claim to the jury, in addition to claims for assault, reckless endangerment and punitive
damages. (R. 1187). After the Lees presented their case in chief, Judge Payne granted
Ranger's motion for partial directed verdict, resulting in dismissal of the false

4

ir lpi isonment claim,, (R , 1187, pp. 213, 222-23).
; --jury answered the Special V erdict formbj finding that I" \ li I angle> did not
Hsisaiill (ii iii(\lless!y mdiiiipn I he 1 ITS M'SIIIIIIIJ1 MI HI III 11 nusr vetrlirl lui Mi I itiij'li \
*\ x, and Ranger. (R. 1009-1012). Because the jury tuui:^

.,ii. ^angley did not

..-V: ->r recklessly endanger the Lees, the other issues appearing later on the Special
V erdict form became moot ,,,,.. were not answered b) the jiir> (R , 1009 1012) I 'hose
issues wen: il I I lllin apporhnniMcnl ml hull innoni' ( n nn»i I tv (ien-ild I tv ,III I I"1 In
Langley; (2) w hether Mr. Langley was acting as an employee of A *, y3) whether Mr.
I angley was acting within the scope of any authority \ .*

* \ y Ranger; and (-T:

whether the Lees sustained any compensatory or punitive' damages. (

I

! iiMyii^JiJ MQ^CLS.
1.

Ijlerald Lee was Arrested Twice in Colorado in 1998 for
Criminal Offenses.

Gerald I ,ee was arrested in Nov ember 1998, in Grand J unction, Coloi ado, for

F.

I-T,. ±i^ was also arrested in Rio Blanco, Colorado, in late 1998, for driving w ithout
r

i »f inswi ante '~

' 2.

] The warrants for his arrest on both charges are still

,ii. i^ee Purchased I i. i o Bail B ci fiii ds fit ci II ii \ 1 in Oi d ei Ill: ci Ill] e
Released from,. Jail

'While in jail for these offenses, Mr. Lee purchased two bail bonds from A 1. (R.
999, Exhibit 2, pp. 016-017). Mr Lee entered into a Bail Bond Application and Contract
5

with A-1. (R. 999, Exhibit 2, pp. 008-010). Ranger was the surety for these bonds,
meaning that if Mr. Lee failed to appear for court hearings in Colorado and the bonds
were forfeited, Ranger guaranteed to pay the Colorado court for the forfeiture. (R. 1187,
p. 258). Ranger did not undertake, in its capacity as surety, to guarantee to the court that
Mr. Lee would appear for the court hearings.(R. 1187, p. 258).
Because Mr. Lee purchased these bail bonds, he was released from jail
immediately. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 10; R. 1187, p. 141). More
specifically, the Colorado court released him into A-l f s custody. (R. 1187, p. 254, M.
Thorpe depo. p. 12). Mr. Lee was aware that if he failed to show up for court hearings in
Colorado, it would cause a forfeiture of the bonds. (R. 1187, p. 146). Additionally, his
failure to appear would cause a warrant for his arrest to issue. (R. 999, Exhibit 1, pp.
001-002).
3.

Mr. Lee Contractually Agreed that A-1 Could Arrest Him if He
Failed to Appear for Colorado Court Hearings.

In exchange for Ranger acting as surety and A-1 acting as bonding agent so that
Gerald Lee could be released from jail, he promised Ranger and A-1 several things in the
Bail Bond Application and Contract. (R. 999, Exhibit 2, pp. 008-010). First, he agreed
that upon his release from jail until his appearance at court hearings, "Ranger shall have
control and jurisdiction over me . . . and shall have the right to apprehend and surrender
me to the proper officials at any time

" (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). He further agreed

that if he left Colorado or failed to appear for court hearings, "Ranger and/or its Agent
shall have the right to forthwith apprehend and surrender me in exoneration of my bail
6

1 hi iiids

" (R. 999, Exhibit 2, p. 008). Thus, if Mr. Lee failed to show up for court

hearings in Colorado, A 1 had the i ight to apprehend him and return him to jail in
i IIIOI.HIU III" I I!'1. ' p M\ '", U I \)\ ' \\ ""vl, M lllioipf ilepo \\ I! Il I

• .

Third, he agreed that if he left Colorado and was apprehended b> A-l, he "agi ee[d]
to voluntarily return to [Colorado], and

waive extradition proceedings and hereby

consent to the application • - .*uoh reasonable force as may be necessary to effect such
I V {Wi Ishibil " |i n't""!' Ill n .is uinli'.pulHl illn! llii • liausc p;\\v \ I 11 in miglit

Minn

to apprehend Gerald Lee if he left Colorado. (R. 118 1 , p. 263).
P Ii , I /ee Failed to Appear for Court Hearings in Colorado
Related to the T " u Offenses.
(I

I SI,

..

violation for December io, iy?o. v/v. n o / , p. ^JJJ. I IJK

X

Colorado, scheduled a hearing on Mi I .ee's DUI violation for January 25, 1999. (R.
1187, p. 265) Mr. I ,ee failed to show up for either court hearing. (R. 1187, p. 109 110).

bail bonds. (R. 1187, p. 146). A-l had the right at this point to apprehend Mi Lee
because he had violated "not only his bail bond conditions with the court, but he also .
violated his bail bond application and contract
pip

>\) Ill

•

•

'

' (R 118 1 , p 254, M. Thorpe depo.
• •

2

.

•••

.

'

.

.'

.'

He testified at trial that he 'failed to appear for the hearings because they were
scheduled on the same day, winch obviously was not true. (R. 1187, pp. 109-110, 145).
7

•

On December 16, 1998, the Rio Blanco court issued a Notice of Forfeiture,
addressed to Mr. Lee, A-1 and Ranger, stating that since Mr. Lee failed to show up for his
court hearing the week before, the bail bond was in danger of being forfeited. (R. 1187,
p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 29-30; R. 999, Exhibit 1, pp. 006-007). The court allowed
A-1 until April 20, 1999, to bring Mr. Lee into court, or else the bond would be forfeited
and Ranger or A-1 would have to pay the court $500 for Mr. Lee's failure to appear. (R.
1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., pp. 30-32).3
5.

A-1 Attempted to Bring Gerald Lee into Court to Avoid
Forfeiture of the Bonds.

Beginning in February 1999, A-1 made several unsuccessful attempts to locate Mr.
Lee and bring him into court in Colorado. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo., p. 34).
These attempts included calling Mr. Lee's former employer, who had co-signed on the
bonds, and calling Mr. Lee's mother in Vernal. (R. 1187, p. 254, pp. 34-38). On April 1,
1999, Maria Thorpe called his employer again and told him she would be coming to
Vernal soon to pick up Mr. Lee and remand him back to the Colorado court's custody.
(R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 38).
6.

Miles Langley Apprehended Gerald Lee on April 2,1999.

Maria Thorpe testified that she did not have a chance to apprehend Mr. Lee
herself, because Miles Langley traveled to Vernal and apprehended him without her

3

The Mesa County Court issued a Notice of Forfeiture on January 25, 1999,
ordering Mr. Lee to appear on March 9, 1999, but is is not known what became of this ®.
999, Exhibit 1, p. 004).
8

direction or knowledge. (R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 38) Ms. Thorpe tesiwtcu
iiun A-i did «n.. f.)h »M i,i.. *.. * o> .

•> jppi'w..wiu. *., . ^ but speculated that 1 le

k'iinx ill o( llir iinprmlnif.1, hirlrilurr ol (In1 bniitll ml Minvlnir Mir nrlii lo nninrehendMr.
Lee, by looking through courthouse records for Notice oi f oiieituiw. ^i~ . _ / , p. 254,
M. Thorpe depo pp. 39-40)

'.

'

The Lees deposed Mi I angle) in 2002. (R 118 ) \ > 55) I le testified that lie wi is

inquire whether he was licensed as a bail recovery agent in Utah in 1999. (R. 1187, p.
55). However, Mr. I ,angley had apprehended fugitives in Utah "numerous times" prior to
1999. (R. 118 7 i > ; 0)
I" ti I angle> cLiimrM (lull

Il lliiiii il linn I ippivhmd If In I

iiii

t

he never had any contact with Ranger and that "they had no idea" A- 1 had lined him. (R.
1187, pp. 74, 80). Mr. Langley testified that he went to the Mesa County courthouse to
confirm -»u. ^ere was an outstanding warrant for Mi I ee' s ai rest on a D U I charge (R. •
118 7 | •

i \ t I < i Mil \ i • 111111 N1 K T i f f s 1 V p; n 11 n i M I I

11 , \ f > i

told the assistant sheriff he was going to apprehend Mr. Lee. (R. 1187, p. b~j. * ~w
assistant sheriff fold Mr Tangle} that Mr. l.ee was staying at the home of his brother
George Lee .:;:•. . r ^

L...

, .: ia.

J.I^.OUS

to George I ,ee' s home (R 118 7 , p 82)

\s

I""1 111. Laiiule^ ncaicd (jeoiute Lee's homi, he slopped al the Nuplcs Poliu: DcparliiR'nl ami
told a police officer that he was in town to apprehend Gerald Lee. (R. 1187, p. 83). After
Mr. Langley showed the officer the arrest warrant, the officer gave Mr. Langley specific

9

directions to George Lee's home. (R. 1187, p. 83).
Mr. Langley arrived at George Lee's home and entered the home after telling
George Lee, who answered the door, that he was with a construction company and
wanted to give Gerald Lee a job. (R. 1187, pp. 85-86). Mr. Langley entered the home,
shook Gerald Lee's hand, then told him he had a warrant for Mr. Lee's arrest. (R. 1187,
p. 86). A scuffle ensued, and George Lee testified that as he went to help his brother, Mr.
Langley elbowed him. (R. 1187, pp. 192-193). Gerald Lee testified that he was also
physically injured in the fight. (R. 1187, p. 119).
Officers from the Naples Police Department arrived at George Lee's home shortly
afterward.4 (R. 1187, p. 90). Mr. Langley took Gerald Lee into custody and drove him to
Grand Junction, Colorado, where he was put in jail. (R. 1187, p. 97). Gerald Lee
testified that he went with Mr. Langley because Naples police officer Steve Hatzidakis
told him he would be arrested if he did not accompany Mr. Langley. (R. 1187, p. 125).
7.

The Lees Sued Ranger for Assault, Reckless Endangerment,
False Imprisonment and Punitive Damages.

Although Ranger never had any contact with Mr. Langley, did not hire him to
apprehend Mr. Lee and was not aware of any fight between the Lees and Mr. Langley
until it was served with the Lees' Complaint, the Lees relied upon Utah Code Ann. §31A35-601(2) as their basis for suing Ranger for Mr. Langley's actions. (R. 1187, p. 260).

4

They cited Langley and the Lees for assault. (Appellants' Brief, xii). Mr.
Langley later plead down his citation to disorderly conduct. (R. 1025).
10

This statute states that:
I he acis or conduct ul any . , . ,,ui; recovery agent. . . who acts within me scope of
"* uHhority delegated to him by the bail bond surety, are considered *»> be the :\•"•
w. conduct of the bail v^.nJ ^«M<-.-, O„. *» w,h fae bail. rec<">*n -i^-^
v *-. • .
a gen i

Ranger presented evidence at Uiai that it did not delegate any authority to Mi Langley to
apprehend Mr I ?e. (R 11 *", pp 259-60; R. 1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. pp. 39-40,
I.

8

1 lie Lees Requested a Default Against Robert Thorpe that
Would Have the Legal Effect of a Directed Verdict Against
Ranger on the Issue of Liability, a Request Judge Payne
Recognized as Overrreaching.

., oginnniL w. . ,v rial inteLiuaj)

,,. ;he Lees argued lhalii Ui.

i:

JK

iA.e-uAei; »-I...^ I p.nie f^

anfor

%rv ^ranted default - ••* * •-* .urainsi Mr. 1 lion** -'iic

" effect would be that Ranger would become automatically liable, and thr . »niy ^ ,ur
for the jury to decide would be damage*

;

denied that A-l lined Mr. LamHc* (R. 88-91).
A

Alalia, lhorpt ^o-ownei of

* testified at trial (through her deposition testimony) that VI di^i.oi hia Mr.

l^angi- ;•, that t ! i 1 had a legal right to apprehend I"l Ii , Lee, and that Kanger did not
delegate .in <> iiilhunl, In I' III! 11 .mpji \ |l!« III1 , p J1 I, M I Imipi ijejiui, pp IS, Si 51).
Frances Trevino, bail operations department supervisor with Ranger, confirmed that
R i iiiger did not delegate any authorit\ ir \ I : T angle\ (R 11 ; ~. pp 256, 258-64).
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Notwithstanding this, the Lees contended that a default should enter against Mr. Thorpe,
and that the effect would be to instruct the jury that Ranger was liable to the Lees for
assault, reckless endangerment, false imprisonment and punitive damages. (R. 1187, pp.
16-18).
Judge Payne denied the Lees' request to default Robert Thorpe, noting that he was
not required to default Mr. Thorpe under the circumstances, that it would be inappropriate
to punish Ranger for Mr. Thorpe's failure to appear when Ranger had no control over
him, and that it would be improper to take the issue of liability away from the jury when
the evidence and the law did not justify it. (R. 1187, pp. 17-18).
9.

Judge Payne Dismissed the Lees' False Imprisonment Claim
Because They Could Not Meet the Legal Elements of This Claim.

At the close of the Lees' case in chief, Ranger moved for a partial directed verdict
to dismiss the Lees' false imprisonment claim. (R. 1187, p. 213). The judge concluded
that George Lee had presented no evidence that Mr. Langley confined or imprisoned him;
Mr. Langley merely entered his home and allegedly struck him, but that action did not
equate to confinement or imprisonment. (R. 1187, pp. 213-215, 222). Judge Payne
further concluded that Gerald Lee had presented no evidence that Mr. Langley acted
without reasonable grounds to believe Gerald Lee had committed an offense. (R. 1187,
pp. 215-16). To the contrary, there were two separate legal bases for Mr. Langley to
apprehend Gerald Lee: one stemming from Mr. Lee's contractual assent to be
apprehended in the Bail Bond Application and Contract, and one stemming from the
common law set forth in Taylor v. Taintor, 89 U.S. 366 (1872), which confers a right
12

upon bail bondsmen to apprehend fugitives, (R , 1187, pp. 215-16).
10.

llthough Judge Payne Ruled In Favor of the Lees on Many
Legal Issues, the Jury Felt After Hearing the Evidence that Mr,
Langley Did Not Assault or Recklessly Endanger the Lees and
Entered a Verdict of No Cause of Action.

Judge Payne observed at the outset of the trial that the Lees were taking
incongruous positions with respect to Utah's Bail Bond Recovery Act, I Jtah Code \ nn.
§§5 1 II 11)1 <Mn/ (R lln 1 [i|i it ."TJ'I. ilic linl 1'Uniul Niiiftit;>A Aguuh.'u! I Ihili

the Lees claimed without any supporting evidence that Mr. Langley was not a licensed
bail recovery agent in Utah and therefore acted without legal authority to apprehend Mr.

Mr. Langley, A 1 and Ranger . (R. 1187, p. 6). Ranger urged the trial court not to apply
the statutes due to this inconsistency, (R , 1187, p. 9) However, the judge permitted the
.

,

• *

ij

1030;. Jud}-* l>::yne also allowed IIK'•• ,, uvei Ra?uvr> oh- •. <

f

•- * ,:tedthat

" .sis 'ITOVCII iL-c'it is ai':"-: withi. ;he scope of ainimrity delegated b\ a bail boi:J
surety when the work performed by the agent benein> ihe surety. (R , 1029)

5

The Lees contend that Judge Payne "ruled eat 1:> on in it le trial that the I Jtah
licensing statute would not be used," but he never made such a ruling or otherwisi i
.mined its applicability. (Appellants' Brief, p. 5; R. 1187, pp. 4-7, 9-12).
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Finally, Ranger attempted to dismiss the punitive damages claim against it, both in
a motion for summary judgment before trial and in a motion for directed verdict after the
close of the Lees' case in chief. (R. 477-633; R. 1187, p. 223). Ranger contended that if
Utah Code Ann. §31A-35-601 was a vicarious liability statute, as the Lees argued it was,
it could only make Ranger vicariously liable in compensator/ damages for Mr. Langley's
acts that Ranger may have delegated to him, but not vicariously liable in punitive
damages. (R. 477-633). Ranger further argued that the Lees presented no evidence that it
acted with the requisite degree of culpability to impose punitive damages under Utah
Code Ann. §78-18-1(2004). (R. 1187, p. 225). However, Judge Payne allowed the issue
of punitive damages to go to the jury, subjecting Ranger to huge financial exposure. (R.
1187, p. 226).
The Lees presented four witnesses on their behalf at trial and were armed with the
above favorable legal rulings. (R. 1187, p. 2). At the close of evidence, the jury received
a Special Verdict form that first asked if Mr. Langley had assaulted the Lees; and second,
if he had recklessly endangered them. (R. 1009-1012). The jury answered both of these
questions in the negative, thereby resulting in a verdict of no cause of action against any
defendant. (R. 1009-1012).
Because the jury found that Mr. Langley did not assault or recklessly endanger the
Lees, it did not need to and did not reach the other questions on the Special Verdict form;
namely, what the fault apportionment should be among Mr. Langley, George Lee and
Gerald Lee; whether Mr. Langley was acting within the scope of any authority delegated

14

by A-1 (in oilier words,, whether A-1 hired him,, to apprehend Mr. Lee); whether he was
acting within the scope of any authority delegated by R anger; what amount of
i iiifxnsfiloin ijaiiiiiif.'cs \\J< n iiirdiilnl am! wlicllin IMIIIIIIM1 diinuigts \u:it w manli il
(R. 1009-1012).
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POr

I he I ees' first issue on, appeal, suffersfrom.,,several, shortcomings. First,
there v asampk INUIUIU lllial Is 11 I anglcy, m am hail innvei^ ayt'iil ton
t j i a t ma tter,

had a let1 a I nvM to appniini 1 <KTMH I tv .is a Unn\t\ r \)« sn Ih.

Colorado coi irt. Taj flof • i ' Taintor, supra, confers a common law right upon
bail recovery agents to apprehend fugitives who have outstanding arrest
II1L1I1 > iiiluk'^ llii* I a . i Hi1 iibiugatch that
law right. Additionallv aaiiai .in illnniativr ln«al basis Im
, x A ehending Mr. Lee, he contractually consented to his apprehension when
he purchased iin. IMM bonds from *
"\ri;ni(»i"l

1

fhi» il r t .. n » I I I ( i k ' t e i \ ifijIOlt/ l i l t ' "I H, "I ' • " " •

wuiiscntcd tu • i{^prehension in their appellate bncl.

» " » » " !!! !"
M

|,k

"'

' -C

'* "e failed to

..• Oial the evidence supporting the trial cowl"- decision to recognize the
,..„,.. , »nguage of the contract,
• iructed the jury
0E

th e j a w 0 f arrest has not been preserved on appeal ' I he I eesfoiled,to

take exception at trial, to the instructions they are now objecting to on appeal
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and therefore cannot challenge their validity on appeal.
Fourth, any error on the trial court's part, and there was none, is harmless.
The law on arrest was not pertinent to the jury's consideration of whether
Mr. Langley assaulted or recklessly endangered the Lees.
POINT II:

The trial court did not err in dismissing the Lees' claim for false
imprisonment because they did not present any evidence in their case in
chief that George Lee was confined or imprisoned or that Mr. Langley
apprehended Gerald Lee without a reasonable basis for doing so. They did
not take exception to the jury instructions they are challenging on appeal
and thus have waived their right to challenge them.

POINT III: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enter default
judgment against Robert Thorpe, particularly when the Lees contended that
the legal effect of default judgment would be to instruct the jury that Ranger
was liable to the Lees for all claims. Again, the Lees ignored their duty to
marshal the evidence supporting the judge's ruling in this regard, and this
Court should therefore affirm the ruling.
POINT IV: The trial court's ruling that George Lee could not testify as to what he
allegedly heard Miles Langley say in another court proceeding was correct
because the testimony was unreliable hearsay and was otherwise
inadmissible. Even if the trial court had allowed the testimony, it would not
have changed the outcome of the case. Whether Mr. Langley had a Utah
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bail recovery license had no bearing on whether he assaulted or recklessly
endangered the Lees.
POINT V:

The trial court properly excluded from evidence a document containing
cryptic handwriting, purportedly showing that Mr. Thorpe paid Mr. Langley
for apprehending Gerald Lee. The document constituted hearsay. In any
event, the Lees achieved their objective of introducing evidence that Mr.
Thorpe hired Mr. Langley through other means, including Gerald Lee's
testimony that he witnessed Mr. Thorpe hand Mr. Langley cash, and Mr.
Langley's testimony that Mr. Thorpe paid him for apprehending Mr. Lee. If
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit this document, there
is no harmful error because the jury did not reach the issue of whether Mr.
Langley acted within the scope of any authority delegated by A-1.
VI. ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE LEES' CONTENTION THAT GERALD LEE
COULD NOT BE APPREHENDED DEFIES COMMON SENSE,
COMMON LAW, AND CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS.
Gerald Lee had two outstanding warrants for his arrest in Colorado in 1999. He
would have been required to remain in jail in Colorado until his court hearings had A-1
not issued him bail bonds releasing him from the court's custody into A-l's custody. In
exchange for his freedom, he agreed that if he failed to show up for court hearings, A-1
could apprehend him. He agreed that if he left Colorado, he could be apprehended. He
17

further promised that if he were apprehended by A-l, he would voluntarily agree to return
to Colorado. Finally, he consented to the use of reasonable force against him to assure his
return to Colorado. (R. 999, Exhibit 2).
The Lees' assertion that he was immune from apprehension and was absolved
from answering for his criminal offenses because he crossed state lines defies common
sense. Their contention that Judge Payne misinterpreted the law of arrest overlooks
longstanding common law permitting bail recovery agents to cross state lines to
apprehend fugitives, and it ignores that Mr. Lee contractually consented to apprehension.
A,

There Were Ample Legal Bases for Apprehending Mr, Lee,

The focus of the Lees' first issue on appeal is whether Mr. Langley was licensed as
a bail recovery agent in Utah. They complain that they should have been able to
introduce hearsay evidence that he did not have a Utah license because they missed their
opportunity to ask him when they deposed him whether he was licensed in Utah. They
believe that if he was not licensed in Utah, he had no authority to apprehend Mr. Lee, but
this is incorrect in many respects.
Significantly, there is nothing in the tangled statutory web they cite (Utah Code
Ann. §§53-11-101, etseq., §§31A-35-601, etseq. and §§77-20-1, et seq.) suggesting that
a bail recovery agent who is duly licensed in another state cannot enter Utah to apprehend
a fugitive. The Lees repeatedly assert on appeal that the statutes prohibit the
apprehension of an individual in Utah by someone who is not licensed in Utah, but they
are unable to point to any statutory provision that says this. Instead, the statutes appear to
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govern bail bond sureties, bail bond agencies, and bail bond recovery agents who reside
in and operate businesses in Utah. The statutes do not address, and were not meant to
address, out-of-state sureties or recovery agents who must pursue a fugitive in Utah
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant from another state.
While the statutes the Lees rely upon do not deal with the situation that arose in
this case, Mr. Langley testified that he had apprehended fugitives in Utah on several prior
occasions without incident. On this occasion, he informed local law enforcement
authorities that he was apprehending Mr. Lee pursuant to valid Colorado arrest warrants.
The Utah authorities did not stop Mr. Langley or inquire if he was licensed in Utah;
instead, they acknowledged his authority to apprehend Mr. Lee and directed Mr. Langley
to his whereabouts.
There were two separate legal bases for Mr. Lee to be apprehended in Utah. First,
the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1872) that
[w]hen bail is given, the principal [fugitive] is regarded as delivered to the custody
of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment.
Whenever they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their
discharge . . . . They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on the
Sabbath; and if necessary, may break and enter his house for that purpose.
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. at 371. Ms. Thorpe testified that Taylor v. Taintor gives bail
bond agents the authority to apprehend fugitives, and to enter another state to do so. (R.
1187, p. 254, M. Thorpe depo. p. 13). Judge Payne reviewed Taylor v. Taintor during the
trial and observed that it confers a common law right for a bail recovery agent to enter
Utah to act upon an arrest warrant. (R. 1187, p. 215).
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The Lees downplay Taylor v. Taintor by referring to a few cases from other
jurisdictions in which the courts determined under different circumstances that state
statutes could override the common law. For example, the court in Walker v.
Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596 (Ky. 2004), concerned a bondsman who detained an
individual in Kentucky without an arrest warrant, in violation of Kentucky law
prohibiting a bondsman from detaining without a warrant. In this case, there were two
valid arrest warrants for Gerald Lee, and Utah's bail recovery statutes are different from
Kentucky's.

The case of Green v. State, 829 S.W.2d 222 (Texas App. 1992), is

inapposite because the Texas court concluded that the state legislature intended to
abrogate Taylor v. Taintor by passing laws that squarely contradicted it. The Lees cannot
point to any Utah statute that contradicts the common law principle of apprehension in
another state set forth in Taylor v. Taintor. The court in Johnson v. County of Kittitas, 11
P.3d 862 (Wash.Ct.App. 2001), merely expressed its view that Taylor v. Taintor contains
dicta but also acknowledges that "it is generally understood to be the seminal authority on
the bond surety's common law authority to seize and surrender the principal...." Johnson,
11 P.3d. at 864. Finally, the court in McFarland v. State, 666 N.W. 2d 621 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2003), simply noted that Taylor v. Taintor did not allow a bondsman to break into
the home he mistakenly thought housed a fugitive.
Even if Utah statute supplanted Taylor v. Taintor, which it does not, there was a
separate legal basis permitting Mr. Lee's apprehension. Mr. Lee freely signed a contract

on

in which he agreed and consented to apprehension. He acknowledged that by purchasing
the bail bonds he was submitting himself to the custody of A-l. The Bail Bond
Application & Contract plainly states that if he commits any act that could cause
forfeiture of the bond, he can be apprehended; he was aware that his failure to appear for
the Colorado court hearings constituted forfeiture of the bond, he acknowledged receiving
a Notice of Forfeiture from the Rio Blanco court stating that the bond could be forfeited
for his failure to appear at the December 1998 court hearing. The contract he signed
additionally provides that if he leaves Colorado, he agrees that he can be apprehended and
brought back to Colorado. He has never alleged that these terms are somehow invalid or
unenforceable.
There was ample reason for the trial court to determine that it did not matter
whether Mr. Langley was licensed as a bail recovery agent in Utah. The judge's
conclusion that Mr. Lee could be apprehended was supported by common law and
contract law, as well as the common sense notion that those who try to evade the law by
leaving one state for another can be brought to justice.
B.

The Lees Did Not Marshal the Evidence Showing the Contractual Basis
for Apprehending Mr. Lee,

When, as here, appellants dispute a ruling that is based on factual findings, they
must marshal the evidence supporting the ruling and show that such evidence cannot
support the ruling. Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 48 P.3d 888 (Utah
2002). Failure to marshal the evidence means the reviewing court will not disturb the
trial court's ruling on appeal. Neely v. Bennett, 519 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
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The Bail Bond Application & Contract was admitted in evidence in its entirety at
trial, and Mr. Lee conceded that he signed it. The Lees did not present any testimony at
trial to undermine the validity of this document. Perhaps because of this, the Lees barely
acknowledge its existence on appeal, instead claiming that Taylor v. Taintor is a relic.
The Lees have failed to present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists; after constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence, and the gravity of that flaw must be sufficient
to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous." Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d at 727. Therefore, the Lees cannot prevail on their
first issue on appeal.
C.

The Lees Did Not Preserve This Issue for Appeal.

The Lees claim that the trial court's alleged error in misapplying the law on arrest
culminated in its refusal to give their requested jury instructions on this subject. The two
jury instructions they claim should have been read are "Utah law requires a bail bond
recovery agent to operate only when licensed by the state of Utah," and citizens "without
law enforcement authority" can make arrests in certain circumstances. (Appellants'
Addendum 53-54). The first jury instruction does not accurately reflect the law, and it
was irrelevant because there was no evidence Mr. Langley was not licensed in Utah. The
second jury instruction was not read because there was no evidence Mr. Langley made an
arrest without law enforcement authority.

The Lees did not take exception to the trial court's refusal to read these
instructions to the jury. Trial counsel must formally make exceptions to jury instructions
on the record, before the jury retires to deliberate on the evidence. Jones v. Cyprus
Plateau Mining Corp., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997). It does not appear from the trial
court transcript that exceptions were conducted. The parties discussed proposed jury
instructions with Judge Payne in his chambers on February 3, 2004 (R. 1187, pp. 291307), but this discussion did not include formal exceptions or any objections to specific
instructions, and the Lees' counsel states on the record that exceptions would occur later.
(R. 1187, p. 307). The next reference to jury instructions in the trial transcript comes the
next morning, before Judge Payne read the instructions to the jury. The Lees' counsel
states at that point that there are no objections to the jury instructions. (R. 1187, p. 310).
Failure to take exception to a jury instruction with specificity precludes the party
from objecting on appeal that the instructions were defective. Jones v. Cyprus Plateau
Mining Corp., 944 P.2d at 359. "[T]o assert that the trial court erred in either giving or
failing to give an instruction, a party must first submit correct instructions and then,
should the court fail to give them, timely except." Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc., 86
P.3d 752, 754 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), citation omitted.
D.

Whether Mr, Langley had Legal Authority to Apprehend Mr, Lee was
not Relevant to the Jury's Verdict So Any Error was Harmless,

Even if the trial court had permitted the Lees to present evidence that Mr. Langley
was not licensed in Utah, and even if the jury heard instructions to the effect that an
individual cannot be apprehended unless the person apprehending him is licensed in Utah
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as a bail recovery agent, that would not have changed the outcome at trial. The jury
quickly disposed of the Lees' lawsuit by finding that the Lees were not assaulted or
recklessly endangered. Authority to arrest had nothing to do with their claims for assault
or reckless endangerment; rather, it pertained to their false imprisonment claim. The
Lees' counsel conceded that "[t]he licensing law has very little to do with the liability of
this case except that it establishes an element of false imprison[ment in] that there was
unlawful activity of the arrest, if you will, the detaining was not based in law." (R. 1187,
p. 20).
An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that a trial court error was harmful,
that is, "that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings." Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489-90 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992). In Steffensen, the plaintiff challenged the trial court's reading of the
defendant's jury instruction on foreseeability, which pertained to her negligence claim.
Although the appellate court determined that the trial court should not have read the
instruction, it noted that the jury found the defendant was negligent, so the reading of the
erroneous instruction was harmless. Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 490; see also Albrecht v.
Bennett, 44 P.3d 838 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (error that does not affect outcome of case is
harmless and will not warrant reversal).
The law of arrest did not pertain to the claims presented to the jury. If the trial
court had read the Lees' requested instructions to the jury, it would not have changed the
result.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY
DISMISSED THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIM
FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE
Since the Lees were unable to assemble evidence in their case in chief that Mr.
Langley falsely imprisoned them, the trial court granted Ranger's motion for partial
directed verdict against their false imprisonment claim. The Lees had the burden of
showing that (1) Mr. Langley acted, intending to confine or restrain the Lees; (2) his
actions resulted in the Lees' confinement or restraint; (3) the Lees were conscious of or
were harmed by the confinement or restraint; and (4) Mr. Langley acted without having
reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Lee committed an offense. (R. 903).
With respect to George Lee's claim for false imprisonment, he never testified at
trial that Mr. Langley confined him, restrained him, or made him feel he could not leave.
(R. 903). There was no evidence that Mr. Langley confined or imprisoned George Lee.
As the trial court aptly noted, Mr. Langley may have entered his home under false
pretenses and engaged in a scuffle with him and his brother, and that may have given rise
to claims for trespass or assault, but not for false imprisonment. (R. 1187, p. 214).
With respect to Gerald Lee's claim, the trial court concluded that there was no
evidence that Mr. Langley acted without reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Lee
committed an offense. Mr. Langley stated in his deposition that he was apprehending
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Gerald Lee pursuant to his belief that there were valid arrest warrants in Colorado for Mr.
Lee. The Lees offered no evidence that Mr. Langley was lying about his belief, or that
the arrest warrants were invalid. Additionally, the trial court observed that since Mr. Lee
contractually consented to apprehension, he "is not in a position now to complain that the
arrest was unlawful." ( R. 1187, p. 216). The court properly dismissed the false
imprisonment claim for lack of evidence.
No reasonable jury could have found based on the evidence offered by the Lees
that George Lee had been imprisoned or confined, or tliat Mr. Langley was not acting
with reasonable grounds to believe Gerald Lee was not evading arrest warrants. The trial
court's grant of directed verdict must therefore be affirmed. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City
Southern R. Co., 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (2004) (directed verdict on proximate cause
affirmed where no reasonable jury could find that small defect in road caused bicycle
accident). Additionally, the jury instructions the Lees claim should have been read
pertaining to false imprisonment were not formally objected to, so the Lees cannot
complain of error on appeal.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO DEFAULT MR. THORPE FOR FAILURE
TO APPEAR
A.

The Lees Misconstrued the Proper Legal Effect of a Default.

If the trial judge had exercised his discretion and granted default judgment against
Mr. Thorpe in favor of the Lees, the appropriate result would be that the Lees would have
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a judgment against A-l alone for their claims, and they could attempt to collect monies
from A-l based on that judgment. However, the Lees clearly view a default against Mr.
Thorpe as a far more expansive weapon. They contend that a default judgment against
Mr. Thorpe would have also given them a judgment against Ranger on liability, and that
the only issue left for the jury to decide would be how much to award against Ranger for
compensatory and punitive damages. (Appellants' Brief, p. 13).
The Lees' position does not make sense. They complain that Mr. Thorpe deserved
to have a default judgment entered against him because he failed to appear at trial, yet
they have no qualms about arguing that Ranger should be held automatically liable in
damages to them, even though Ranger appeared at trial. They urged the trial court to
determine as a matter of law, before any party presented evidence, that Mr. Langley
assaulted, recklessly endangered and falsely imprisoned the Lees; and that Ranger
authorized these actions. The Lees wanted the trial court to prohibit Ranger from putting
on a case and defending itself, merely because an individual over whom Ranger had no
control failed to show up for trial. If third parties could be so severely punished for
someone's failure to appear in court, Ranger would have been well positioned to ask that
George Lee be flogged because his brother did not appear in court in Colorado.
The trial court accurately sensed that the Lees would attempt to abuse a default
judgment against Mr. Thorpe and exercised it discretion to refuse the Lees' request. The
third issue on appeal does not raise any grounds for disturbing the jury's verdict.
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B,

The Trial Court Granted Ranger's Request for Default Judgment
against A-1 Because there was No Dispute that A-1 was Obligated to
Indemnify Ranger for Costs Associated with the TriaL

The Lees' argument that the trial court was required to grant the Lees a default
judgment against Robert Thorpe on their claims once it granted Ranger default judgment
against A-1 for contractual indemnity ignores that the bases for granting the default
judgment would be entirely different. The Lees asked the trial court to default Mr.
Thorpe because failed to appear for trial. On the other hand, Ranger asked the trial court
for judgment on its indemnity claim against A-1 because there was no claim and no
evidence that the contractual indemnity clause between A-1 and Ranger was invalid or
unenforceable. Moreover, it asked for judgment either in the form of a directed verdict or
a default judgment.
Ranger filed a cross-claim against A-1 in 2002 for contractual indemnity. ( R.
111-114). Specifically, the Bail Bond Underwriting Agreement between A-1 and Ranger
states that A-1 shall "indemnify, hold and save [Ranger] harmless from 100% of any and
all costs, expenses and liabilities, including but not limited to . . . attorneys' fees . . . trial
preparation expenses, court costs . .. and the like . . . in connection with the subject
matter of this Agreement.. . ." (R. 999, Exhibit 2). A-1 never challenged the validity of
this indemnification duty or otherwise presented evidence against it. (R. 1187, 226-27).
Consequently, Ranger moved during trial for a directed verdict against A-1 on its
indemnity cross-claim, or in the alternative, a default judgment against A-1. (R. 1187, pp.
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226,252).
Judge Payne granted both motions in the alternative. (R. 1187, p. 252). Thus, if
Judge Payne somehow became obligated to grant the Lees' request for default against Mr.
Thorpe just by granting Ranger's request for default against A-l, such mechanical
reasoning could be avoided by recognizing that the judgment against A-l was
alternatively a directed verdict.
C.

Because the Lees did not Marshal the Factual Circumstances Justifying
Judge Payne's Denial of Their Request for Default Judgment This
Issue Cannot be Considered on Appeal,

The Lees do not explain in their appellate brief why Judge Payne ruled as he did.
Since they ignore the factual underpinnings of his denial of their request for default
judgment, this Court need not reach the merits of their third issue on appeal.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
PRECLUDING GEORGE LEE FROM TESTIFYING THAT MR. LANGLEY
TESTIFIED IN ANOTHER COURT HEARING THAT
HE DID NOT HAVE A UTAH LICENSE
A.

The Proposed Testimony was Inadmissible Hearsay.

During the direct examination of George Lee, the Lees' counsel asked him about a
justice court hearing he attended in Colorado regarding the assault citations issued to him,
his brother and Mr. Langley arising from the April 2, 1999 scuffle. (R. 1187, p. 200).
When Mr. Lee began to testify that Mr. Langley made a certain statement in the justice
court hearing, Ranger objected on the ground of hearsay. (R. 1187, p. 200). The trial
court sustained the objection. (R. 1187, p. 202).

The Lees now ask for a new trial because the judge's ruling was allegedly
incorrect. Nonetheless, the question posed by the Lees' counsel, and the partial answer
Mr. Lee gave, show that the proposed testimony was hearsay. Mr. Lee was intending to
testify that Mr. Langley made a certain remark on a prior occasion. Hearsay "is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah Rule of Evidence
801(c).
The proposed testimony does not fall outside the definition of hearsay, nor is it an
exception to the hearsay rule. It is not an admission by a party opponent, as the Lees
allege, because the statement was not being offered against Mr. Langley, it was being
offered against Ranger. Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). Additionally, for a statement
to be considered an admissible admission by a party opponent, the proponent must
demonstrate that the declarant "manifested an adoption or belief in its truth." Utah Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(2). The Lees did not make this showing to the trial judge before he
sustained Ranger's objection, nor do they make this showing on appeal.
The Lees' alternative assertion that the proposed testimony constituted a statement
against interest under Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) is equally faulty. A statement
"which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability,
or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true"
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qualifies as a hearsay exception under this rule. Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). Mr.
Langley had no reason to believe that he was jeopardizing his self-interest if he testified
he was not a licensed Utah agent. Indeed, the Lees did not shown Mr. Langley had any
cause to think he would be exposing himself to liability for damages stemming from the
April 2, 1999 scuffle if he were not licensed in Utah. Trial judges' rulings regarding Rule
804(b)(3) are fact sensitive and are therefore based on their considerable discretion. State
v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Judge Payne did not abuse his discretion
in precluding Mr. Langley's out-of-court statement.
B.

Any Error in Precluding this Testimony was Harmless.

There are two separate reasons why any error in precluding George Lee from
providing the proposed testimony would not warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. First,
the Lees' attorney stated what the proposed testimony would be in the presence of the
jury. In debating the objection from Ranger that Mr. Lee's impending comment, if
uttered, would be hearsay, the Lees' counsel told the judge, in the jury's presence and
earshot, that "we have an admission he's not licensed." (R. 1187, p. 201). Thus, the Lees
achieved their intended objective, through their attorney instead of their witness.
Second, the issue of whether Mr. Langley was a Utah-licensed bail recovery agent
did not pertain to the questions of whether he assaulted or recklessly endangered the Lees.
Had the jury heard from George Lee's mouth rather than their attorney's mouth that Mr.
Langley testified he was not licensed in Utah, it would not have affected their decision
that the Lees were not wronged by any defendant on April 2, 1999.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT A
DOCUMENT ON REBUTTAL WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR
After Ranger presented its case to the jury, the Lees called Gerald Lee as a rebuttal
witness. (R. 1187, p. 276). The Lees' counsel attempted to introduce a document in
evidence purportedly containing Mr. Thorpe's handwriting and purportedly dated April 3,
1999. (R. 1187, p. 277). The Lees hoped to introduce the document as evidence that Mr.
Thorpe paid Mr. Langley for apprehending Gerald Lee, and therefore as evidence that Mr.
Langley was hired by A-1 to apprehend Gerald Lee. (R. 1187, p. 280). Ranger objected
that the document was not authenticated and that it constituted hearsay, and the court
sustained the objection. (R. 1187, pp. 278-79).
The trial court correctly rejected the Lees' argument that the document qualified as
an admission by a party opponent under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The Lees were
attempting to introduce this document not against Mr. Thorpe, who allegedly made an
admission in the document, but against Ranger. Furthermore, at the time Mr. Thorpe
allegedly marked the document, on April 3, 1999, the purported statement that he paid
Mr. Langley was not an "admission." It was of no import on that date whether A-1 hired
Mr. Langley, because the Lees had not yet filed their Complaint claiming that A-1 was
liable for Mr. Langley's acts as its alleged employee.
In any event, even if the trial court committed error by excluding the document, the

error was not prejudicial. The Lees introduced evidence in their case in chief that Mr.
Thorpe hired Mr. Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee, through the testimony of Mr.
Langley, and through Gerald Lee's earlier testimony that he saw Mr. Thorpe hand Mr.
Langley $350 in cash. (R. 1187, p. 131). Thus, the Lees had already achieved the
purpose of providing testimony that Mr. Langley was acting under A-Ts direction and
authority and that Mr. Thorpe had paid $350 to Mr. Langley. The introduction of the
document would not have constituted true rebuttal testimony, but merely cumulative
testimony.
Additionally, the Lees argue that the document supported their claim that Mr.
Langley was acting in the scope of authority delegated by A-1. This is a question the jury
did not need to reach on the Special Verdict form. Because it had already determined that
Mr. Langley did not commit any wrongful acts against the Lees, the issue of whether he
acted independently or as A-lfs agent was moot. The Lees' final issue on appeal does
not create harmful error.
CONCLUSION
The Lees do not challenge the jury's verdict, and it must stand. They have not
offered any convincing reason for this Court to reverse the verdict and remand to the trial
court for a second trial. Judge Payne did not commit any legal errors, much less any
errors that would have changed the outcome. Ranger respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the judgment below.

,/¥* day of January, 2005.

DATED this

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

M iaime P. Blanch
Tfystan B. Smith
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Ranger
Insurance Company
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The videotape deposition of MARIA E.
THORPE, taken at the offices of Rusk & Rusk Court
Reporters, 751 Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand
Junction, Colorado 81506, on the 22nd day of
December, 2003, at 9:53 o'clock a.m., before
Joppa H. Smith, Registered Professional Reporter
and Notary Public at Large.
*

*

*

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Your Honor, ladies
and gentlemen, today is December the 22nd
of 2003. The following deposition is being
videotaped by Esther Rusk of Rusk & Rusk
Court Reporters, at the conference room of
their office at Skyline Building, 751
Horizon Court, Suite 110, Grand Junction,
Colorado 81506, in the matter of George M.
Lee and Gerald Lee, Plaintiffs, versus
Miles Walter Langley, Robert P. Thorpe and
The Ranger Insurance Company, Defendants,
and filed in the Eighth Judicial District
of Uintah County, State of Utah, Civil No.
000800126. This deposition has been
noticed by the Defendants, The Ranker
Insurance Company. The deponent is Maria
Thorpe. The time is approximately 9:55
*** N01

APPEARANCES

GREGORY SANDERS
KIPP & CHRISTIAN

10 Exchange Place
Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
On Behalf of Plaintiff;

JULIANNE P. BLANCH
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place
Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145,
On Behalf of Defendant.
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a.m.
Counsel will now identify themselves
for the record.
MS. BLANCH: Julianne Blanch for
Ranger Insurance Company.
MR. SANDERS: Craig Sanders for the
Plaintiffs.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Joppa Smith, the

court reporter, will now swear in the
deponent.
* * *
MARIA E. THORPE,

being produced and sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MS. BLANCH:

Q. This is Julianne Blanch. Mrs.
Thorpe, can you state your full name for the
record.
A. It's Maria Elizabeth Thorpe.
Q. Do you own a business named A-l Bail
P Bonds?
A. Not currently, no.
23
24
Q. Did you in 1999?
25
- p o • * n8

A. Yes.
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Q. Where were the offices for A - l Bail
Bonds in 1999?
A. W e had an office at 2 2 5 West Grand,
and then at one point in 1999 w e m o v e d the
office to 6 0 0 White Avenue.
Q. In April o f 1999, where w a s it in
Grand Junction, Colorado?
A. I believe it w a s still at 2 2 5 West
Grand.
Q. In 1999, were there other owners of
A - l Bail Bonds?
A. It was a joint ownership between
myself and m y husband.
Q. What is your husband's name?
A. Robert Paul Thorpe.
Q. Your husband has been named b y the
Lees as a defendant in this lawsuit, and I
understand he has s o m e health problem.
There is a jury trial scheduled for
this case in February, and if there is a reason
that he doesn't s h o w u p due to his health, the
jury m a y wonder w h y he's not there.
Can y o u briefly explain his health
problems, without getting into any things that
are too private?
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A. Well, it began w i t h - - o n M a y 2 4 o f
19 - o f 2 0 0 0 , m y son passed away. A n d then in
July o f 2001 m y husband had a heart attack. A n d
then in 2 0 0 2 he had a mild - y o u k n o w , a
partial stroke that impaired his sight. Then he
had acute pancreatitis and an infection around
the pancreas, which the doctors had to put in a
drainage tube that w a s in place for several
months. A perforated ulcer. S o he's got an
ongoing history o f medical problems.
Q. Can y o u tell u s some o f your
background in the bonding business.
When did y o u start?
A. I ' m not sure o f the exact year. It
w o u l d b e in the neighborhood o f maybe 1996, but
I ' m not positive.
Q. S o y o u have been in the business
since then?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Is -- A - l Bail Bonds, w a s it a
bonding agency?
A. Y e s .
• Q. Can y o u describe for us what a
bonding agency does?
A. We're insurance producers. W e

Notes * * *
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provide insurance to the court that a defendant
1
will appear.
2
If he doesn't appear, then w e write
3
for the insurance company, and that if w e don't
4
pay the bond liability that the courts demand
5
upon order of judgment, then we're liable for
6
that, the insurance company is liable for it, if
7
the defendant is not remanded b y the judgment due
8
date.
9
Q. Y o u mentioned that y o u provide an
10
insurance t o the court that a defendant will
11
appear.
12
Are y o u talking about a criminal
13
defendant or a civil defendant?
14
A. Criminal.
15
Q. D o y o u have any certifications or
16
licenses for your business?
17
A. Yes, I ' m insured b y the State o f
18
Colorado. I have an insurance producer
19
license.
20
Q. In your business, do y o u contract
21
with sureties?
22
A. Could y o u be more definitive?
23
Q. Sure. Ranger, the company I
24
represent, is a bail bonding surety. D o y o u
25

Page 9
contract with —
A. Right. In order to write bonds in
the State o f Colorado, y o u either have to be a
cash bondsman, where y o u put u p 5 0 , 0 0 0 with the
state, otherwise, y o u have to receive an
insurance appointment in conjunction with your
license to produce bail.
Q. In 1999, w a s Ranger a surety for A - l
Bail Bonds?
A. Y e s , m a ' a m .
Q. Were there any other sureties at the
time?
A. Later in 1999 w e had an appointment
with Granite State Insurance.
Q. Can y o u let u s k n o w what a surety
does in this bail bonding process?
A. A surety is a — guarantees to the
court that if the bondsman w h o posted the bond,
and it's a contract that w e enter with the
court, that if the defendant is not remanded back
into custody within the time allowed b y the
court prior to the entry of judgment, then
ultimately the surety is liable to the court for
that amount.

*** Notes ***

Q. Let's talk a little bit more about
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Page 11
Page 10
1 wants to go the route of a surety bond to get
the bonding process.
2 out of jail, how would he find -- how would he
If a person is booked into jail for
3 hook up with A-1 Bail Bonds; would there be a
something like driving under the influence, they
4 list at the jail where he could choose among the
go to jail in Grand Junction, Colorado, they're
5 various bail bondsmen in Grand Junction?
booked.
6
A. At the jail, the jail is segmented
If they want to get out of jail, do
7 into different pods, and each pod has a bulletin
they have to file a bond?
8 board by the phones, and on those bulletin
A. Right. There's three types of bond
9 boards are the advertisings of every bonding
in the State of Colorado.
There's a cash bond. So if they
10 agency that wishes to advertise at that
have $500 cash, they can - if they have the cash
11 facility.
at the time that they're booked in, they can
12
Q. Okay. And if the person who has
request that the booking tech takes that cash
13 been arrested contacts your company for a surety
from their books, and then that's forwarded to
14 bond, do you go out to the jail to meet him and
15 get the paperwork signed?
the court, and that's a secured bond.
16
A. Procedurally, we contact a
They can post a surety bond, and
17 co-signer first, they call us by phone, we get
that's when they use a bail bondsman to post
18 the information, we get family information or
certified funds, you know, with the court.
19 friends who will indemnify the bond for us,
Or they can post a property bond.
20 contact them, the paperwork is done prior to the
Actually, there's four types.
There's also a PR bond, a personal recognizance
21 defendant' s release.
bond, but they usually have to see the judge
22
Q. What is the role of a co-signer in
first before a judge will order a PR bond, or
23 the bonding process?
they're interviewed by pre-trial services.
24
A. They indemnify and hold the
Q. If someone who has been arrested
25 sureties harmless from the potential liability
* * * Notes * * *
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that could arise from a defendant's failure to
appear.
Q. So if a criminal defendant used you
for a surety bond, and filled out an application
with you, and then they failed to show up at
court, the co-signer could be financially liable
for their failure to appear?
A. That's correct.
Q. When a criminal defendant files a
bond with your company, is he essentially
released by the court into your custody?
A. Right. It's a continuation of their
original incarceration.
Q. So even though he's able to leave
the jail, is he still considered to be in the
custody of the court system and in the custody
of A-1 Bail Bonds until he goes to court?
A. Right. He's in legal contemplation
of the surety, it's just a continuation of his
original incarceration.
Q. Okay. When a criminal defendant is
released from jail and then he has a court
hearing, if he fails to show up for court, does
A-1 Bail Bonds have any right as a bonding
agent to bring the criminal defendant into
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court?
A. We have a legal right to apprehend
and return a defendant back into custody.
That's a right that was provided to us way back
in the common law, back to Taylor vs. Taintor
back in the 1800s. That has been the basis of
every statutory provision thereafter, so and it pretty much says that we can seize and
surrender a defendant any time, any day, at any
location.
Q. You mentioned Taylor vs. Taintor. Is
that a U.S. Supreme Court case?
A. That's correct.
Q. And a pretty old one?
A. Y e s .
Q. When a criminal defendant files a
bond with A-1 Bail Bonds, do you have him sign a
bail bond application?
A. Yes, he signs a bail bond
application; he signs a checklist so he
understands what his obligations to our company
is and what his duties are to the court; he
signs an appearance bond with the court that
has special conditions on the appearance bond
as well.

• • • *WV\tgc % % *
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Page 14
1 it common that a criminal defendant would file
Q. Okay. When he signs the application,
2 a bail bond application within a day or two
is there a statement in there where the criminal
3 after he's been arrested for a criminal
defendant acknowledges that you can apprehend him
4 violation?
and bring him to court if he fails to show up for
5
a court hearing?
A. It's - they generally file it at
6 the time of their release.
A. Absolutely.
7
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the facts
Q. From jail?
8
of this particular case involving Gerald Lee.
A. Yeah. We go into the jail, we
9 provide the necessary document to the court
As I understand it, Gerald Lee, one
10 clerk - I mean to the jail clerk, and then the
of the plaintiffs here, was arrested for a DUI
11 defendant is released to us in the lobby -- or
by the Grand Junction, Colorado police on
12 at the office is generally where that paperwork
November 29, 1998; does that sound right to
13 is filled out, moments after his release.
you?
14
A. I would have to check my paperwork,
Q. Okay. Let's look at the bail bond
15 application that Mr. Gerald Lee signed.
because I don't have a recall of the exact
16
dates.
MS. BLANCH: And we'll mark this as
17
Q. Okay.
Exhibit 1.
18
A. If that's all right.
(Exhibit 1 marked).
19 BY MS. BLANCH:
Q. Yes, that's okay, please go ahead.
And if it will help you with the
20
Q. Mrs. Thorpe, Exhibit 1 is a 3-page
dates, there's a bail bond application contract
21 bail bond application and contract, the top of
22 it is dated November 30, 1998, and it says
that's dated November 30, 1998.
23 agent, Maria Thorpe, and at the top it says
A. Right, that would have been the date
24 Ranger Insurance as well.
of his release.
25
Q. Okay. To shortcut the process, is
The next page of it has writing, and
* * * ]sj0< :es ! _ .
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1
there's a signature, Gerald Lee, signed November
2
30, 1998.
3
And then the third page is entitled
4
indemnitor/guarantor checklist.
5
A. Yes.
6
Q. Let's talk a little bit about
7
Exhibit No. 1.
8
We were talking earlier about how a
9
criminal defendant, when he wants to get out of
10
jail, may elect to get a surety bond, and if he
11
elects to choose A-l Bail Bonds as the bail
12
bonding agent, then you have him sign a bail
13
bonding application that sets forth the agreement
14
among the parties.
15
Have you seen Exhibit 1 before?
16
A. Yes.
17
Q. Okay. And on the second page, if
18
you could turn to that, there's a signature in
19
the middle, Gerald Lee, dated November 30,
20
1998.
21
A. Uh-huh.
22
Q. To your knowledge, did he sign that
23
document?
24
A. As far as I know.
25
Q. Okay. Is your husband usually the
* * * ^^ftfp^
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one who is present when a criminal defendant is
signing a bail bond application?
A. No, generally I do the paperwork.
Q. Okay. To the best of your
recollection, did Mr. Lee sign that document in
your presence?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Okay. Let's talk about the first
page of the bail bond application, and paragraph
1 towards the bottom of page 1 says, Ranger shall
have control and jurisdiction over me.
Is me Mr. Lee?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Okay. During the term for which my
bail bond is executed and shall have the right
to apprehend and surrender me to the proper
officials at any time for violation of my bail
bond obligation to the court and Ranger as
provided by law.
Can you explain for us what that
means?
A. What that means is that, as we
discussed previously, Ranger Insurance and the
surety, myself, have the right that if he
violates any condition of bail, to go and
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apprehend the defendant and remand h i m back
into custody, s o as to minimize our liability.
Q. N o w , Ranger Insurance Company is in
Texas. In all of your dealings with Ranger ~
first of all, did y o u deal with them on other
criminal defendants besides Mr. Lee?
A. Well, w e ' v e written hundreds o f
bonds through Ranger.
Q. Okay. A t any time did you meet
anyone from Ranger Insurance in person?
A. The only time that If ve ever met
anyone from Ranger Insurance w a s at a Bail
Association meeting in Las Vegas, and it w a s
just - it didn't pertain to business as such,
you know, concerning a specific defendant, no.
Q. Okay. S o in the normal course o f
business, y o u s i e v e r m e t anyone from Ranger
Insurance C o t i p a n y ?
A. N o , ma'am.
Q. D o e s Ranger Insurance Company ever
meet any o f the bail bondsmen that y o u
independently contract with?
A. N o , ma'am.
Q. If w e look at paragraph 2 A o f the
first page o f Exhibit 1, the bond application,
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Page 19
it says, it is understood and agreed that any
one o f the following actions b y me.
A n d that is, again, Mr. Lee?
A. Yes, m a ' a m .
Q. Shall constitute a breach o f m y
obligations to Ranger, and that Ranger and/or its
agent.
Is A - l Bail Bonds the agent?
A. Yes, m a ' a m .
Q. Shall have the right to forthwith
apprehend and surrender m e in exoneration o f m y
bail bond.
A n d subparagraph A says, if I depart
the jurisdiction o f the court without the written
consent o f the court and Ranger or its agent.
Can y o u explain to for us what that
means?
A. Well, as a condition o f the
appearance bond, when Mr. Lee was released from
custody, he signs an appearance bond, and, in
effect, he's signing a contract with the
court.
Part o f the conditions o f those
bonds is that he cannot depart the jurisdiction
o f Colorado without written consent o f the

* * % ^^VvtpQ
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Page 201
surety and o f the court, and if he did not
1 A - l Bail Bonds the right to apprehend him?
obtain that - to m y knowledge, he did not obtain
2
A. Y e s , m a ' a m , that - at that point
that consent.
3 he violated his - not only his bail bond
4 conditions with the court, but he also
Q. A n d as y o u w o u l d learn later, he
5 violated his bail bond application and contract
actually went to Utah w h e n he w a s released from
Grand County -- or Grand Junction, Colorado jail,
6 with us.
7
Q. Okay. A n d w e were talking earlier
he went back to Utah?
8 about h o w if someone w h o files a bond, a criminal
A. Y e s .
9 defendant, fails to s h o w up for a court hearing,
Q. Okay. S o what he did w a s a violation
10 that that also gives A - l Bail Bonds, as the
of paragraph 2 A o f Exhibit 1, the bail bond
11 bonding agent, the right to g o and apprehend
application?
12 him, e v e n if he doesn't leave the jurisdiction;
A. Y e s .
13 is that correct?
Q. Okay. A n d then that gave Ranger
14
A. That's true.
and A - l Bail B o n d s the right to apprehend
15
Q. Let's look at paragraph 3 o f
him?
16 Exhibit 1. It says, if I depart the jurisdiction
A. Y e s , m a ' a m , to surrender him.
17 o f the court wherein m y bail bond is posted b y
MR. SANDERS: Excuse me, I ' m going
18 Ranger f o r - to object, it calls for a legal conclusion.
19
THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, could
G o ahead and answer.
20
you BY MS. BLANCH:
21
MS. BLANCH: GO slower?
Q. A n d - g o ahead. D i d y o u give your
THE REPORTER: Well, just a little
answer?
1 22
23
bit.
A. Could y o u repeat yourself?
24
MS. BLANCH: Sure.
Q. Sure. A n d did - the fact that he
25 BY MS. BLANCH:
left to g o to Utah, did that give Ranger and
• • • ^^r^fpc * * *
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1
first one liable, but you said you have certain
2
resources.
A. Right.
3
Q. You can go against the co-signer,
4
5
Mr. Wade Montgomery, and it also sounds like from
6
this that you could go against Mr. Gerald Lee to
7
get your money back?
8
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Paragraph 6 says, I
9
understand I am responsible if it becomes
10
necessary to arrest and surrender the
11
defendant.
12
Is Mr. Lee the defendant in this
13
paragraph?
14
A. That's correct.
15
Q. And that I am responsible for
16
17
paying all reasonable costs incurred for
18
locating, apprehending, transporting and
19
surrendering the defendant to custody.
20
What does that mean?
21
A. Back to the original jurisdiction.
22
Well, to custody could mean any law enforcement
23
agency can take him into custody if it's-a
24
warrant that's entered into NCIC. If it's a
25
statewide warrant only, that means he has to be

Page Z
returned to Colorado and remanded to any law
enforcement officer within the State of
Colorado.
Q. Okay. And it's also talking about
how he is responsible for paying reasonable costs
for locating or apprehending him.
If he does not show up to court and
law enforcement or A - l Bail Bonds has to get
him and bring him to court, does this mean that
he's responsible for the costs associated with
that?

A. That's correct.
Q. Let's look at parajgraph 7. I
understand that if the bail is ordered forfeited
by the court, that I am responsible to pay
court costs and reasonable appearance or attorney
fees, and a minimum of $1100 is written in
there, for the bail agent to reinstate or
exonerate the bail bond if necessary.
Does that mean that he has to pay
up to $1100 if he doesn't show up to court and
either law enforcement or A - l Bail Bonds has to
apprehend him?
A. That's correct.
Q. The amount of the bond at the top

* * * Notes * * *
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1 chance to go through your file and see if you
of the indemnitor/guarantor checklist is $500,
2 have a receipt for the original.
and the premium amount is $75.
3
A. I don't have that in here.
Does - how much did Wade Montgomery
4
Q. Okay.
have to pay A - l Bail Bonds for the bond, if he
5
A. I don't know what happened to it.
is, in fact, the one that paid anything to A - l
6
Q. Okay. N o w , Gerald was supposed to
Bail Bonds?
7 appear in court on December 1 6 , 1 9 9 8 , and he
A. Well, the one who paid should have
8 failed to appear, according to court documents.
signed the receipt. I don't have the Ranger
9
Exhibit No. 2 that we'll mark is a
receipts, they're not in the file, the file
that I have, the Ranger receipts.
10 notice of forfeiture and citation to show cause
Ranger is a three-part contract,
11 for Mr. Lee.
and the top two parts have a receipt and
12
(Exhibit 2 marked).
statement of charges, and then the top is for
13 BY MS. BLANCH:
the collateral. So whoever signed the bottom
14
Q. Exhibit 2, this notice of forfeiture,
here (indicating) would have been the one from
15 is stamped December 3 ~ excuse me, December 23,
whom we received the monies from.
16 1998, stamped by the court.
Q. Okay. And Gerald Lee's signature
17
Can you tell us what this document
is at the bottom of what you are showing us?
18 means?
A. This is the second bond.
19
A. This is a notice from Rio Blanco
Q. Okay.
20 court to myself and to Ranger Insurance and to
A. So I don't know, without looking at
21 Gerald Lee that - as well as the prosecuting
the document, whether he posted--whether he
22 attorney in his criminal case, that he failed to
paid us or his co-signer did.
23 make his court appearance on the date that was
Q. Okay. W e will at some point take a
24 scheduled by the court.
break during this deposition and let you have a
25
Q. Okay.
* * * ^^otf*Q
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A. Thereby forfeiting the bond.
l
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Okay. And the date of the court
2
Q. Okay.
appearance, it looks like, was December 16,
3
A. This is - this document says that
1998?
4 I'm cited to appear on January 20 to show that A. Yes, ma'am.
5 why a judgment default should not be entered
Q. Okay. And he didn't show up for it
6 against me. If I fail to appear for the judgment
is what this document is saying?
7 hearing - for the default hearing to show
A. That's correct.
8 cause, or I don't have legal cause that would
Q. Okay. And it then gives you a
9 persuade the court not to enter judgment, then
certain amount of time to apprehend him; is that
10 the court enters judgment, and then there's a
right?
11 judgment due date.
A. Not - well, this document says
12
So there's going to be a notice of
that they scheduled a hearing for us to appear
13 judgment similar to this document (indicating),
in Rio Blanco court to show cause. If we don't
14 and on that particular document it will have the
appear at the hearing or we don't have any legal
15 judgment satisfaction date, and it's by that
grounds to show cause why judgment should not be
16 date that the defendant has to be remanded into
entered against the surety, then at that time
17 custody or judgment has to be paid.
the court enters judgment. On the judgment
18
Q. On January 20, 1999, did you or
19 someone from A-l Bail Bonds go to the order to
document it will say that he has to be
surrendered by a certain date, otherwise that
20 show cause?
judgment payment has to be paid to the court.
21
A. No, ma'am, not that I'm aware of.
Q. According to that court document
22
Q. For some reason the date got
then, if you don't bring him into the court by
23 extended to April 20 of 1999 by which Mr. Lee
January 20 of 1999, then you have to pay the
24 needed to be brought into court by you or law
court money?
25 enforcement?
• • • No ;es : _ .
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A. Right.
1 out, is addressed to several people, including
Q. Why was that?
2 you at A-l Bail Bonds.
A. The Rio Blanco court reviewed the
3
Did you receive a copy of this notice
case on January 20. At that date if no one from
4 of forfeiture?
our office had appeared or we didn't have legal,
5
A. Yes, ma'am.
you know, cause to - that judgment should not
6
Q. When you received that notice, did
be entered, then that April date is the date that
7 you contact or try to contact Mr. Gerald Lee
the court is saying have him in my courtroom by
8 about having him come back for - to get him back
April or in custody, otherwise you're going to
9 into the custody of the court?
have to pay the judgment order.
10
A. Yes, ma'am.
11
Q. Okay. What I'm showing you as
Q. Okay. And that date that he needed
to be brought back to the court was April 20 of
12 Exhibit 3 is a conversation log.
1999?
13
(Exhibit 3 marked).
A. That sounds correct, but I can't say
14 BY MS. BLANCH:
with certainty without looking at the judgment
15
Q. This is something that you were kind
order.
16 enough to give me last week.
Q. Okay. To your best recollection, was
17
MS. BLANCH: And we'll let Mr.
it April 20 of 1999?
18
Sanders take a look at it, because he
A. Yes, ma'am.
19
hasn't seen it before.
Q. And if Mr. Lee were not brought back
20
THE WITNESS: No, he doesn't have a
to court by that date, how much would you have
21
copy of that.
to pay the court?
22 BY MS. BLANCH:
A. The $500.
23
Q. Can you tell us what Exhibit 3 is?
Q. The notice of forfeiture, Exhibit
24
A. Exhibit 3 is a conversation log that
D - or, excuse me, Exhibit 2, as you pointed
25 was in my computer database, that when I was
*** Noi :es 5_ .
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1
trying to purge old letters or - out of the
A. Co-signer.
2
computer, 1 came across it, so I wasnft aware we
Q. Okay. And that would be Mr. Wade
had had that.
3 Montgomery?
4
Q. Okay. And when did you find it?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Let's look at the second
5
A. Only like a couple of weeks ago when
6 entry, which is March 19,1999. What did you do
I started going through, because there's no space
7 on that date to try to get Mr. Lee back into
on my computer hard drive.
8 court?
Q. Did your ~ do you know when you
9
created this conversation log?
A. Well, apparently there was no
10 communication from the 23rd of February to
A. Well, it would have began on 2/23 of
11 March 19, so at that point we advised Mr.
'99, because that would have been the first
12 Montgomery of his contractual obligations, and
entry, and then I would have gone back on a
13 told him that if Mr. Lee could not come back to
regular basis to update it.
14 Colorado or would not come back, then he would
Q. So there are several dates on the
15 have to send us a $1,000 check to secure the
conversation log, all in - most of them in
16 liability.
1999?
17
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. What did he say to that?
18
Q. One is in 2003. So you would have
A. He said that he would try to get 19 from what I can remember, was that he told us
entered these various entries on the conversation
20 where — that Mr. Lee was staying at his
log close to the time of the date?
21 brother's house, and as much as I - I can't
A. Yes.
22 remember details, other than - my inclination
Q. Okay. Let's look at the first entry,
23 is that he was going to get ahold of Mr. Lee and
which is February 23, 1999. It says, called C/S
24 have him get ahold of us.
at his business, will call back tomorrow.
25
Who is C/S?
Q. What does the next entry say?
!_ .
*** Notes
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1
A. That we called back the co-signer's
A. I started erasing it without
2 realizing what it was, and I went back in, and
place of business, and his wife answered, and
3 I guess my mind was 2003, not '99, so I
that she was going to relay a message to her
4 apologize.
husband.
5
Q. Mr. Montgomery?
Q. Okay. In case anyone is wondering
6 where you got Mrs. Lee's phone number for ~
A. Yes, ma'am.
7 Gerald Lee's mother, on the bond application,
Q. What is the date of the third
8 which is Exhibit 1,1 notice that there is a
entry?
9 phone number for a — it says mother, Mona Rae
A. March 23 of'99.
10 Lee, and then has her phone number?
Q. What is the next entry?
11
A. March 24 of'99.
A. Right.
12
Q. What does that say?
Q. Is that how you got her phone number
13 to call her?
A. It said we called Gerald's mom,
14
and she said that when she saw him, she would
A. Yes.
15
relay the message to him, that he needed to
Q. Okay.
16
take care of the forfeiture and come back to
A. To the best of my knowledge. I mean
17 if her number has changed, we could have called
Colorado, because we always try to discuss with
18 information or done some, you know, minor
people that ~ you know, come back voluntarily,
19 investigation to find the new number.
do a book and release, it won't take that
20
long, and then that way it's cleared up for
Q. Okay. And then the last entry,
21 which is dated April 1, and you said 1999, what
everybody.
22 does that say?
Q. Okay.
23
A. This should be April 1 of '99
A. It says the co-signer called, and I
24 had ~ I is myself, that I would be leaving to
(indicating).
25 go to Utah to pick up Gerald and return him to
Q. Okay.
*** N01.es J _
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Colorado, and that he would be liable for those
1
A. N o .
expenses.
2
Q. Had A - l Bail Bonds ever hired Mr.
3 Langley to do anything for A - l Bail Bonds?
Q. Okay. On April 1 o f 1999, did y o u
4
A. NO.
have plans yourself to go to Grand Junction and
pick him up?
5
Q. Was Mr. Langley ever an employee of
A, Yes, I had - - 1 do remember talking
j 6 A - l Bail Bonds?
to the co-signer and saying if you can't send m e
7
A. N o .
the $1,000, then w e need to get him picked up and
8
Q. Did y o u or your husband hire Mr.
9 Langley to apprehend Gerald Lee in Utah?
remanded back into custody.
10
A. N o .
Q. What happened after that?
11
Q. Did y o u ask him to apprehend Mr. Lee
A. I didn't go to Utah right away, I
12 in Utah?
just - because I didn't give the exact date to
13
A. N o .
Mr. Montgomery. The next thing I know, the
Q. A s y o u came to find out, Mr. Langley
defendant was brought back by Miles Langley.
I 14
Q. Okay. Who is Miles Langley?
| 15 apprehended Mr. Lee in Vernal, Utah, and brought
A. Miles Langley is a gentleman that
j 16 him back to Colorado.
D o y o u have any idea h o w Mr. Langley
resides in Colorado, w a s doing bail recovery
I 17
18 would have found out that there w a s a notice of
for some bonding agencies. He was a bouncer at
19 forfeiture and that Gerald Lee needed to come
a bar. I mean Miles did, y o u know, odds and
20 back to Utah by April 20?
ends jobs.
21
A. Only by speculation.
Q. Did Miles Langley hold himself out
Q. What is your speculation?
as a bail bondsman?
I 22
A. Miles regularly hung out at
A. Not to m y knowledge.
j 23
24 different bond offices, and he would go out and
Q. Okay. Had y o u ever - had A - l Bail
25
party with one of the subagents that w e had
Bonds ever worked before with Mr. Langley?
j
* * * Notes * * *
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working there, she had the forfeitures on her
1
desk, and I don't know if she could have given
2
him the forfeiture to g o take care of or if he
3
would have seen it on one of the desks. Y o u
4
know, w e had a pawn shop at that location, so
5
there were people in and out all the time.
6
7
Q. Okay. Would it also have been
possible for him to go to court and look through
8
the documents and see that he needed to be
9
brought back to Utah - or to Grand Junction,
10
11
Colorado?
12
A. Yeah. Miles w a s in and out of the
13
courthouse a lot of times, so if he was at any
14
of the hearings, he could have been there even
15
at the time that the judge w a s ordering
16
forfeiture on a particular case.
17
Q. N o w , when Mr. Langley came back to
18
Grand Junction with Mr. Gerald Lee, did he come
19
to A - l Bail Bonds?
20
A. I wasn't there, s o I don't know if he
21
came to A - l Bail Bonds first or if he went to the
22
jail first. I don't know.
Q. Okay. N o w , some of your answer for
23
this next question m a y be something that you
24
learned from your husband, and if it is, please
25

Page 41
let us know that, so that w e know that it's
something that your husband told us.
D i d Mr. Langley talk to your husband
around April 3 of 1999 about paying him for
apprehending Mr. Gerald Lee?
A. N o t to m y knowledge.
Q. Okay. When Mr. Langley came back
with Mr. Gerald Lee to Colorado, did he take him
straight to the courthouse?
A. Well, he wouldn't have taken him to
the courthouse, he would have taken him to the
jail.
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, did that
happen?
A. Yes, he was taken to the jail.
Q. Okay. And then h o w did A - l Bail
Bonds find out about that; did the jail contact
A - l Bail Bonds?
A. N o , the j ail wouldn' t have contacted
us. I don't know if Mr. Lee called Bob after he
had been booked into the jail or if Miles came
back. I don't know how they communicated that
he w a s back in town.
Q. Okay. But at some point A - l Bail

Bonds learned that Mr. Lee was back in Colorado;
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is that right?
1
A. The judges usually elevate the
A. Thatf s correct.
2 amount that is required to - for their release.
Q. And that he was in jail?
3 Obviously a $500 secured bond wasn't enough to
A. That's correct.
4 warrant Mr. Lee to come back and take care of
5 his court obligations, so by increasing that
Q. And at that point, because he was
in jail, was it necessary for him to get a second
6 amount, the courts are trying to provide an
7 additional incentive, financial incentive, that
bond?
A. For his release, yes. Bob revoked
8 they'll return.
the Mesa County bond, and then posted two bonds
9
Q. Okay. Does A-l have any bail - or
to secure his release on the new warrant
10 did A-l have any bail bondsmen as employees?
amounts.
11
A. No.
12
Q. Were they independent contractors?
Q. So when Gerald Lee came back to
13
A. They're what's called subagents.
Colorado on April 3 of 1999, the first bond
14
Q. It sounds like there were times when
that we've been talking about, the one dated
15 someone got a bond with A-l Bail Bonds, they
November 30, 1998, was revoked; is that right?
16 failed to appear, and you needed to go apprehend
A. The Rio Blanco bond was never
17 them.
revoked at the Mesa County Detention Facility.
18
Sometimes it sounds like you would
The Mesa County bond was revoked at the Mesa
19 do it; is that right?
County Detention Facility. To my knowledge,
20
A. Yes.
he was remanded into custody on the Rio Blanco
21
Q. Would your husband ever do it?
warrant, as well as the Mesa County warrant.
22
A. Sometimes.
Q. The second bond is in the amount of
23
• Q. And then sometimes you would hire
$750, while the first one back in 1998 is in the
24 these independent contractor bail bondsmen to do
amount of $500.
25 it?
Why was the second bond more?
* * * "Nfotp^i
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A. As far as I can remember, we've only
1 job?
hired one person as an independent bail recovery
2
A. Yes.
agent, James Julianno out of New Mexico, to
3
Q. When you used Mr. Julianno as an
apprehend somebody that was out of state.
4 independent contractor bail bondsman, how did
Actually, there's twice. I had a
5 you pay him, how did you reimburse him for
Kelly - a defendant by the name of Kelly
6 apprehending the individual?
Bradbury that had fled on a plane, and she went
7
A. By check.
to Arizona, and I contacted some bail agency
8
Q. Do you understand that Mr. Langley
in Arizona to meet her at the airport to
9 has testified before in this case, he's given
detain her until I showed up and could bring her
10 a deposition just like you have in this case?
back.
11
A. Yes.
Q. Were there any bail agents or bail
12
Q. It' s my understanding that he
bondsmen that you hired inside of Colorado to
13 passed away. Do you know whether he has either
apprehend someone inside of Colorado?
14 way?
A. No.
15
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. In the bail bonding industry,
16
Q. Mr. Langley said in his deposition
is it typical for a company like A-l Bail Bonds,
17 that your husband, Robert Thorpe, paid him money
if they're going to hire an individual to go out
18 to go get Mr. Lee in Vernal, Utah.
and apprehend someone, just to hire them for a
19
Is that true, to your knowledge?
particular job?
20
A. No.
A. Can you say that again?
21
Q. Have you looked through bank
Q. Sure. If someone like A-l Bail
22 statements and cancelled checks from A-l Bail
Bonds needs to hire a bail bondsman to apprehend
23 Bonds in April and May of 1999 just to verify
an individual, is it typical in the industry
24 that no check was ever given by A-l Bail Bonds
for them to hire them just for that particular
25 to Mr. Langley?

*** Notes ***
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A. Yes.
Q. What have you found?
A. There was no such payment.
Q. Okay. Go ahead.
A. There was also Gerald and Sherry
Green that we've used for recovery, but like I
said, those are just on a limited basis. And we
would hire some out-of-state people to find
people that are out of state to minimize our
costs, because we donft know the areas, and it
just takes a lot of time.
Q. And have you paid all of those
individuals with a check?
A. Yes.
MS. BLANCH: Let's mark as Exhibit 4
what I've put in front of our court
reporter.
(Exhibit 4 marked).
BY MS. BLANCH:
Q. This is something that you sent to me
last week; is that right?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Okay. As Mr. Sanders is looking it
over, because he hasn't seen this yet, could you
tell us what Exhibit 4 is?
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A. It's bank statements for our business
account, for A-l Bail Bonds.
Q. From what time period?
A. I believe from the end of March
until maybe May or June.
Q. Okay. And why did-A. Prior to the date of his recovery,
and then a month or more after that time.
Q. Why did you get those bank
statements?
A. To look to see if a payment had, in
fact, been made. You know, just to clarify, so
that I could make exact responses today. Even
though I had no knowledge of any payment, I
just wanted to double-check for my own peace of
mind.
Q. And you've also brought cancelled
checks with you, I noticed?
A. Yes, ma'am, so that if there's any
misunderstanding about any amount that appears
on there, that the actual check can be viewed to
see to whom it was endorsed and where it was
cashed and the date it was issued.
Q. Okay. If Mr. Sanders wishes during a
break, will he be able to look through those

* * * MntpQ * * *
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cancelled checks?
1
Q. So one is dated November 30, '98, the
A. Absolutely.
2 other is dated April 3 of '99?
Q. But you can tell us now that after
3
A. That's correct.
looking at your bank statements and the cancelled
4
Q. Between the time that you learned
checks, there were no checks made out to Miles
5 that Miles Langley had apprehended Gerald Lee
Langley?
6 and brought him back to Colorado and the time
A. No, ma'am.
7 you issued the second bond on April 3 of 1999,
Q. We have been talking about two
8 did you or anyone at A-l Bail Bonds tell Ranger
bonds, one is November 30, 1998, and then there
9 that Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee?
was a second one. I don't know if you've
10
A. I don't believe so, no.
brought that with you.
11
Q. Did you or anyone else at A-l Bail
A. I think both bonds were originally
12 Bonds tell Ranger about the circumstances of
written on the same date, and then when he was
13 how Mr. Langley had apprehended Mr. Lee?
re-incarcerated, both bonds would be posted on
14
A. I don't believe so.
the same date, to the best of my knowledge.
15
Q. Okay. To your knowledge, would
Q. Okay. The second bond would have
16 Ranger have had any way of knowing that there
been dated around April 3 of 1999, wouldn't it
17 was a scuffle between Mr. Langley and the Lee
have?
18 brothers during the apprehension?
A. Yes, ma'am. April 30 maybe. April 3
19
A. Not by our agency, no.
or April 30, I'm sorry.
20
(Exhibit 5 marked).
Q. Okay. Between the time that you
21 BY MS. BLANCH:
learned 22
Q. What we've marked as Exhibit 5 is a
A. April 3.
23 copy of the bail bond underwriting agreement
Q. Okay. April 3?
24 between Ranger and A-l Bail Bonds.
A. Yes, ma'am.
25
MS. BLANCH: And I don't know
* * * ^^V\f/*c * * *
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1
whether Mr. Sanders has ever seen this.
2
Have you?
3
MR. SANDERS: Is it this?
4
MS. BLANCH: Yes. It appears that
5
he does.
I6
BY MS. BLANCH:
7
Q. Is what has been marked as Exhibit 5
8
the contract between A-1 Bail Bonds and Ranger
Insurance that was in place in 1999?
,9
A. Yes, ma'am.
110
Q. I wanted to direct your attention to
|11
paragraph 3 , where it says relation of company,
12
general agent and agent.
13
Is the company Ranger?
14
A. I'm not sure, because this contract
15
was provided to us by NABBS, North American Bail
j 16
17
Bonds. They were our general agents. They're a
18
company that was between ourselves and Ranger.
19
So NABBS contracted with Ranger, I contracted
20
with NABBS.
21
Q. Okay. So just like when I 22
okay. When I get automobile policies for m y
23
automobiles, I go to m y agent, I don't go
24
directly to the insurance company?
25
A. That's correct.
* * * Notes
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1
agent is A-1 Bail Bonds, is that of principal and
independent contractor.
2
3
Was that your understanding?
4
A. W e l l Q. S o you were sort of an independent
5
contractor vis-a-vis Ranger?
6
A. That's correct.
7
Q. Okay. Then it says, agent shall
8
have exclusive control over his retail bail
9
business, shall set his or her o w n working
10
hours, and shall retain or discharge employees
11
or independent contractors in agent's sole
12
discretion.
13
A n d the w a y that the relationship
14
worked between Ranger and A-1 Bail Bonds, was
15
that true, y o u had control over all 16
A. That's true.
17
Q. - details of your business?
18
A. Yes, ma'am.
19
Q. A little further down in the
20
paragraph it says, agent is solely responsible
21
for seeking out and obtaining any and all
22
specialized knowledge and skills necessary in
23
his or her professional function, and is
24
similarly solely responsible for the proper
| 25

Page 5
Q. Okay.
A. I did not sign this contract in
front of Ranger, y o u know, with Ranger, I - it
w a s a - I was being appointed by North
American Bail Bonds to write for Ranger, and then
North American Bail Bonds had a contract with
Ranger.
Q. If w e look at the very first
paragraph o f the underwriting agreement, the
contract between A-1 and Ranger, it m a y clarify
this.
It says, this agreement is entered
into the 11th of March, 1998, by and between
Ranger Insurance Company, and there are some
more words there, then A-1 Bail Bonds,
hereinafter general agent, and Robert Paul Thorpe
and Maria Elizabeth Thorpe, A-1 Bail Bonds,
hereinafter agent or A. See, here, this clarifies.
Hereinafter RIC or company is referring to
Ranger.
Q. Okay.
A. S o that's correct.
Q. Okay. S o if w e look at paragraph 3 ,
it says, the relation of company and agent, and
***
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screening, selection and hiring of all employees
and/or independent contractors retained by
agent.
A n d is that the w a y the relationship
worked between y o u and Ranger?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. S o if you wanted to go out
and apprehend someone, y o u were the one with
the skills and knowledge necessary to do that?
A. A n d the authority.
Q. Okay. S o that's not something that
Ranger could dictate to you h o w to do it,
because that wouldn't have been practical?
A. They never did. There w a s never any
communication.
Q. Okay.
A. There was never any exception
either.
Q. A n d then if w e look at paragraph 8
of the agreement, which is found on page 3, it
says, agent duties with regard to bond
principals. Agent shall be solely responsible
for the negotiating, underwriting, securing and
posting of bail bonds issued to secure the

release from custody of criminal defendants,
*** Notes ***

